Variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini, 2006) are an important class of ambiguity averse preferences, compatible with Ellsberg-type phenomena. In this paper, a new foundation for variational preferences is derived in a framework of two-stages of purely subjective uncertainty. A similar foundation is obtained for purely subjective maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) . By establishing their axiomatic foundations without the use of extraneous probabilities, the conceptual appeal and applicability of these ambiguity models is enhanced.
Introduction
Despite being inconsistent with subjective expected utility, the uncertainty averse pattern of preferences suggested by Ellsberg (1961) has been defended normatively (Gilboa, Postle- waite and Schmeidler, 2012; Gilboa, 2014) and descriptively (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Halevy, 2007) . Many new theories have emerged to accommodate such behaviour (Gilboa and Marinacci, 2013 ). An important class of uncertainty averse preferences are the variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006), MMR hereforth. Variational preferences generalise the maxmin-expected utility (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeider (1989) . The main theorem of this paper characterises a fully subjective version of variational preferences. The special case of purely subjective MEU preferences is also characterised.
In this paper, we consider preferences over acts with two stages of subjective uncertainty.
As with Savage (1954) , we employ a rich set of states and allow the outcome set to be arbitrary. Ellsberg-type preferences, in our case, refers to being more uncertainty averse towards first-stage uncertainty than second-stage uncertainty. That is, we assume source dependence of uncertainty attitudes (Heath and Tversky, 1991 (Ergin and Gul, 2009; Strzalecki, 2011) . Indeed, we will assume that, while second-stage uncertainty can be subjective, the decision maker displays no particular aversion to such uncertainty. The two-stage framework is used to develop a subjective notion of averaging events and averaging acts. Ellsberg's example corresponds to a decision maker who prefers first-stage uncertainty to be averaged out. We call such a preference second-stage uncertainty aversion. It will be shown that, when combined with other known axioms, second-stage uncertainty aversion characterises purely subjective variational preferences.
To the best of my knowledge, there has been no purely subjective foundation for variational preferences. For MEU, there has been more success, although a foundation at the full level of generality of Savage (1954) Alon and Schmeidler, 2014) . A particular benefit of this approach is that, unlike the approach taken in this paper, it allows for finite state spaces. The topological richness of the outcome set facilitates the derivation of cardinal utility and separation of decision weights from utility, yielding a biseparable representation (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2001 ). Variational preferences are not necessarily biseparable, hence such approaches have not yielded new foundations for variational preferences. This paper advances the literature by characterising purely subjective variational preferences in a different, special case of the Savage (1954) framework.
Ellsberg and Multiple Stages of Uncertainty
The acts considered in Ellsberg (1961) can be naturally viewed as having two separate stages of uncertainty (Segal, 1987 Machina, 2011) . A simple version of Ellsberg's three-colour problem imagines a ball will be chosen from an urn containing three numbered balls. Ball 1 is red, and the remaining balls are either yellow or black. In the first stage of uncertainty, the composition of the urn, a colour for each remaining ball, is determined. In the second stage, the number of the ball is determined.
Hence, the outcome of choices in this problem are determined by the realisation of two states, and , where ∈ { , , , } and ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Consider the following choices:
Choice One.
pays £100 only if red.
′ pays £100 only if yellow.
pays £100 only if a red or black.
′ ̃ pays £100 only if a yellow or black.
The modal pattern of preferences seems to be preferred to and̃ preferred tõ . The above presentation makes it clear that the commonly preferred acts, and̃ , have no firststage uncertainty. For some reason, the acts with uncertainty about the second-stage un-certainty are disliked. In the following section, the two-stage framework is formalised so that, in Section 6 this aversion to uncertainty about second-stage uncertainty can be precisely defined. When combined with known axioms, this will provide the key axiom for variational preferences in this framework.
The Two-Stage Framework
Let  denote a finite set of first-stage states with -algebra   . Let  denote a set of secondstage states with -algebra   . Let  denote a finite set of outcomes. 1 We impose richness on the second-stage state space  in what follows via a structural condition (second-stage
The set of acts is  and contains all such functions. The decision maker is modelled using a preference relation ≽, a binary relation defined over .
If ∈   is a first-stage event, then refers to the act such that ( , ⋅) = ( , ⋅) if ∈ and ( , ⋅) = ( , ⋅) otherwise. If ∈   is a second-stage event, then refers to the act such that (⋅, ) = (⋅, ) if ∈ and (⋅, ) = (⋅, ) otherwise. An act is constant if there is ∈  such that, for all ∈  and all ∈  , ( , ) = . We abuse notation and write to mean the constant act yielding . An event ∈  , ∈ {,  }, is null if ℎ ∼ ℎ for all , , ℎ ∈ , otherwise it is non-null.
Given an act ∶  ×  →  and first-stage state ∈ , we define the second-stage act Subjective expected utility evaluates acts as follows:
where is a joint probability measure over   ⊗   , and ∶  → ℝ is a strictly ≽-increasing utility function.
Denote by   the set of all finitely additive probability measures over the first-stage state
is grounded if its infimum value is zero. Preferences ≽ have a subjective variational representation if acts are evaluated as follows:
where is a probability measure over second-stage events   , ∶  → ℝ is a strictly ≽-increasing utility function and ∶   → [0, ∞] is a grounded, convex, and lower semicontinuous function. The function is called the ambiguity index. In this paper, the probability measure is convex-valued: for all ∈ [0, 1] there exists ∈   such that ( ) = .
Variational Preferences in the AA Framework
The Anscombe-Aumann (AA) framework is the special case of our framework where  is already equipped with a convex-valued probability measure
second-stage acts induce, via the probability measure on  , lotteries on . Let Δ() be the set of lotteries over . Suppose the act takes values in { 1 , … , }. Then, the act can be identified with a function ∶  → Δ() such that:
We call an AA act, the set of which is  * . Preferences ≽ over  naturally induce preferences over  * . For all , ∈  * , and ∈ [0, 1], define + (1 − ) as the AA act that yields the well-defined lottery ( ) + (1 − ) ( ), for all ∈ . The set of AA acts  * can then be taken to be a convex set. The key axioms for variational preferences, weak certainty independence and uncertainty aversion, and the continuity axiom used, all make explicit use of the convexity of the set of acts.
Axiom MMR1 (Weak Ordering): Preferences ≽ over  * are complete and transitive.
Axiom MMR2 (Weak Certainty Independence): For all , ∈  * , lotteries , ∈ Δ(), and ∈ (0, 1): 
The following theorem characterises variational preferences in the AA framework: 
Second-Stage Subjective Expected Utility
Consider the following axioms for preferences ≽ over :
Axiom 1 (Weak Ordering): Preferences ≽ over  are complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity):
( , ) ≽ ( , ) for all ∈  and ∈  only if ≽ .
Axiom 3 (Non-Degeneracy):
There exist constant acts such that ≻ .
Axiom 4 (Weak Comparative Probability):
For all events , ∈   and outcomes 
preferences are represented by invariant second-stage expected utility if acts are evaluated as follows:
where ∶ ℝ → ℝ is monotonic, mixture-continuous, and vertically invariant, is a convex-valued probability measure over   , and ∶  → ℝ is a strictly ≽-increasing utility function. This class of preferences encompasses subjective variational preferences. 
Averaging Events and Acts
The uncertainty aversion axiom captures a preference for hedging subjective uncertainty. If ∼ holds, the mixture
smooths out the subjective uncertainty of each act. Here, we construct a similar idea using only subjective uncertainty. The approach taken here is admittedly less straightforward. We will use the notion of a second-stage event average. 2 There it is called Weak  Independence.
A second-stage event average of two events and will, intuitively, correspond to an event that evenly mixes the probabilities of and . To visualise the idea, consider the following example. Imagine a container of different coloured rice (or similar fine material).
There is red, yellow, and possibly other coloured rice. Bets will be placed on the colour of a grain selected from the mixed bucket. Event is "red" and event is "yellow". Suppose that:
The interpretation is that the decision believes there are more red grains in the mix than yellow. Abdellaoui and Wakker (2005) refer to being revealed as more likely than in a basic sense. Now suppose we can scoop out a subset of red grains and add the same amount of yellow grains back. Then, "red" is the event ⧵ and "yellow" is the event ∪ . Suppose that, perhaps by iterating the procedure, we elicit the following indifference: 
and ∼ ∪ holds if and only if,
Given ( ) > ( ) and ⊂ ⧵ , these are jointly equivalent to:
Using the notion of a second-stage event average, a notion of averaging acts can be constructed. For two acts and , in each first-stage state , replace the second-stage acts and with equivalent binary acts ( ) and ( ) , then construct an act with second-stage acts ( ( ) ) such that each ( ) is a second-stage event average of ( ) and ( ):
Definition (Second-Stage Act Average): Given acts , , ℎ ∈  and outcomes , ∈  with ≻ and ≽ ≽ for = , , ℎ and, for all ∈ :
where ( ), ( ), ( ) ∈   , is a second-stage act average of and ℎ if, for all ∈ , ( ) is a second-stage event average of ( ) and ( ).
This definition of averaging acts is purely subjective. It would be problematic if it de-pended on the particular and outcomes, but our axiom set rules out such a dependence.
Implementing the definition could, depending on the acts under consideration, require the elicitation a large number of indifferences. 
The following axiom uses the above notion of second-stage act averages to define a subjective version of the uncertainty aversion axiom: to the symmetry of their descriptions, ∼ * is reasonable, and we assume this holds: 
where is a probability measure over first-stage events   , is a probability measure over second-stage events   , ∶  → ℝ is a strictly ≽-increasing utility function and ∶ ℝ → ℝ is strictly increasing and continuous. Theorem 2 of Strzalecki (2011) gives the equivalence of concave and second-order risk aversion. Our theorem 3 shows the equivalence of concavity of the obtained in Theorem 1 and second-order risk aversion.
Maxmin Expected Utility
Preferences ≽ have a subjective maxmin expected utility (MEU) representation if acts are evaluated as follows:
where is a convex-valued probability measure over second-stage events   , ∶  → ℝ is a strictly ≽-increasing utility function and ⊆   is a convex set of probability measures.
They are a special case of variational preferences, seen by taking that is zero on and infinite outside of . Hence, the axioms of Theorem 2 are necessary but not sufficient for
MEU. An additional axiom is required, as follows: We now state the following foundation for purely subjective maxmin expected utility: 
Discussion of Frameworks of Uncertainty
The main results of this paper have been to characterise existing ambiguity models in a framework different to their original axiomatisations. This section discusses the frameworks commonly employed in modelling choice under uncertainty, to justify and clarify the contribution of this paper. Choice under uncertainty is now a vast field with various frameworks employed. Let us restrict attention to frameworks that employ, as primitives, a set of states , with -algebra of events   , and a set of outcomes . States and outcomes are primitives in the sense that, once these objects are understood, all other constructions can be made only in terms of these objects. For example, an act is a function from  to , the set of acts is  ⊆   , a preference relation is a subset ≽⊆   ×   , and so on. The following frameworks are well-known:
The Savage Framework: Acts are measurable functions from  to .  has a rich structure (solvability).  is an arbitrary set.
The Wakker Framework:
Acts are measurable functions from  to .  is an arbitrary set.  has a rich structure (topologically connectedness or algebraic solvability).
The Anscombe-Aumann Framework: Acts are measurable functions from  to Δ().
 is an arbitrary set.  is an arbitrary set. Δ() is the set of lotteries over .
The trade-off between the Savage and Wakker frameworks is quite clear. The Savage frame-work retains complete flexibility with the outcome set , hence theories developed in that framework are applicable for monetary outcomes, health outcomes, non-divisible goods, and so on. This price of this flexibility with  is the requirement that  has a rich structure. 4 Conversely, in the Wakker framework, the richness is bourne by , allowing for complete flexibility of the state space. Hence, the Wakker framework allows for monetary outcomes ( = ℝ) and finitely many states, highly relevant for economic theory. Of course, requiring richness of  rules out applications to non-divisible goods, and so on.
In a sense, the Anscombe-Aumann (AA) framework retains the nicest properties of both the Savage and Wakker frameworks. The AA framework allows both  and  to be arbitrary. However, the axiomatic derivation of expected utility, with cardinal utility and a unique subjective probability measure, requires additional structure. The AA framework's additional structure comes in two parts:
1. There are two stages of uncertainty.
2. The second stage of uncertainty is characterised by objective probabilities.
The additional structure imposed is very convenient. 5 Axioms and proofs developed in the AA framework are more transparent. Clearly, however, this additional structure has some costs involved. Fishburn (1970:167) refers to the AA framework as one that employs extraneous probabilities. Ther term "extraneous" seems, at least to this author, to be carefully chosen. If one is describing the assumption that some objective probabilities are assumed, the more usual term would be "exogenous". Fishburn's use of the term "extraneous" seems to refer to both the fact the AA framework takes probabiliites as exogenously given, and the opinion that such objects are "surplus to requirement". Regarding the use of two stages, 4 Certainly, in Savage's expected utility,  must be infinite. It is not necessarily uncountable. 5 Anscombe and Aumann (1962) actually assumed three stages of uncertainty, and reduced it to two stages. The presentation follows the modern interpretation. Also, the AA framework has also been used to describe the assumption simply that  is convex, without necessarily committing to the lottery interpretation. In this paper, we maintain the interpretation of a set of lotteries.
while there are many occasions where multiple sources of uncertainty are present, it is a restrictive assumption. Trautmann and Wakker (2015) and others have criticised the use of backward induction implicit in the two-stage evaluation commonly used in the AA framework. Inspired in part by these concerns, further frameworks have been developed. Sarin and Wakker (1997), for example, cleverly avoided the use of two stage acts. Instead of uncertainty followed by risk, they assume uncertainty alongside risk, hence acts are either uncertain or are risky lotteries.
The Sarin and Wakker Framework: Acts are either measurable functions from  to , or elements of Δ().  is an arbitrary set.  is an arbitrary set.
Ergin and Gul (2009), and this paper, retain the two-stage feature of the AA framework, and all of its criticisms, but dispense with the requirement that the second stage of uncertainty is quantified by objective probabilities:
The Ergin and Gul Framework: Acts are measurable functions from  ×  to .  and  have rich structures (solvability).  is an arbitrary set.
The specific two-stage formulation of the Ellsberg paradox used in Section 2 is an example of the Ergin and Gul framework. In this paper, we have assumed that both stages are subject to subjective uncertainty, but only the first stage is subject to ambiguity. That is, subjective uncertainty that cannot necessarily be quantified by a subjective probability measure.
Uncertainty aversion here refers to the dislike of subjective uncertainty that the decision maker finds too "ambiguous" to confidently assign any unique probability. The distinction between first and second stage is made a priori, rather than revealed by preferences. This limitation has been discussed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005: 1872-5). A decision maker, when presented with the Ellsberg choices, may well entertain any belief about the composition, have second-order beliefs about such beliefs, have beliefs about the experiment in general, and so on. We have imposed a very specific set of assumptions. In certain applications the distinction can be quite clear, in particular if the decision maker has certain competences. For example, one might reasonably expect that an expert political commentator is more confident in his beliefs about the next US presidential election than his beliefs about the outcome of the Kentucky Derby. Of course, if the decision maker is a horse racing pundit, the converse is more reasonable. This connection between competence and ambiguity is supported by experimental evidence (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Fox and Tversky, 1995) . Nevertheless, this remains a limitation of the approach used here.
There is an ever-present trade-off involved in choosing a framework to model uncertainty.
In terms of applicability, realism, and simplicity, no one framework seems to be dominant in all aspects. Worse still, whichever framework is chosen, there are always assumed objects that simply must be regarded as hypothetical. For example, both the existence of constant acts for all outcomes, and the assumption that preferences are defined over all conceivable acts, even those counterfactual to any plausible reality, are highly questionable.
One might claim that, if some aspects of each framework are necessarily hypothetical, then surely it does not matter if a hypothetical randomisation device is also used. Given this, it is reasonable to ask, at this point, does the choice of framework really matter? After all, subjective expected utility can be derived in all of the above frameworks, and this involves constructing objects with the same properties as a randomisation device. When we know it is not really necessary, the use of a hypothetical randomisation device that greatly simplifies the axiomatic work seems to be quite acceptable. For ambiguity models, further reassurance has been provided by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (2003) , who show how many results developed with a hypothetical randomisation device can be recovered in the Wakker framework. However, their approach, based on a weak biseparability assumption, does not apply to variational preferences. Although a hypothetical randomisation device can be suitably defended, it would be concerning if a model simply could not be derived without such a device. This paper has addressed this concern for the variational preferences model. This paper characterises variational preferences in a purely subjective framework. The key assumption was that, as in the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) approach, there are two stages of uncertainty. Even without the linear structure delivered by a randomisation device, multiple stages of uncertainty seem to be useful for utility measurement. 6 Savage's expected utility axioms were extended to this framework, and axioms introduced: 
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The necessity of the axioms follows from substituting the preference functional and elementary manipulations, hence the details are omitted here. We show the sufficiency of the axioms for the representation. The standard axioms for subjective expected utility hold for induced preferences over second-stage acts. Hence subjective expected utility holds over second-stage acts, for some utility and convex-valued probability measure over   . Let
) ( ) denote the subjective expected utility of a second-stage act. Let
}. For ∈ [0, 1] and acts , ∈ , define ( ) + (1 − ) ( ) pointwise, so that:
Note that, because is convex-valued, we are assured that () is a convex subset ℝ . By finiteness of , there is a best outcome and worst outcome . By eventwise monotonicity, it can be shown that, for all ∈ , ≽ ≽ . Normalise so that ( ) = 1 and ( ) = 0. Consider an act ∈ . By second-stage solvability there is a ∈   such that ∼ . If ℎ = , notice that that (ℎ ) = ( ) for all ∈ . Define utility function for acts ∶ ℝ → ℝ as follows: ( ( )) ∶= { (ℎ ) ∶ ∼ = ℎ} for all ∈ .
Preferences ≽ over acts  are represented by the map ↦ ( ( )).
We now show that satisfies three properties: monotonicity, mixture continuity, and ver- 
Because and ℎ are first-stage constant, ℎ is first-stage constant and, letting̃ = ℎ,
By the second-stage sure-thing principle, axiom 6, ℎ ∼ ℎ only if ∼ , which holds if and only if (recall ( ) = 0): 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
The necessity of the axioms involves only substitution of the preference representation. We prove the sufficiency of the axioms for the representation. Axioms 1-7 hold, hence preferences admit a representation ↦ ( ( )), with monotonic, mixture continuous, vertically invariant and concave. Second-stage constant independence allows us to establish that is linearly homogeneous: For all ∈  and ∈ [0, 1] we have ( ( )) = ( ( )).
Let ∈  be an act and let be a first-stage constant act such that ∼ , or equivalently ( ( )) = ( ( )). There exist acts̃ and̃ such that̃ is a second-stage act average of
